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Best Mode Disclosure in Canadian Patents
David Vaver*
But men may construe things after their fashion,
Clean from the purpose of the things themselves.
- Shakespeare, Julius Caesar (I, iii)
Abstract: A recent decision of the Federal Court of Canada, endorsed by the
Federal Court of Appeal, holds that the duty under the Patent Act to provide
in the patent specification the best mode of working the invention applies
only to machines and no other class of invention.

This paper reviews the

history of the best mode requirement, from its origin in the wording of 18th
century British patent grants and its migration into late 18th U.S. and early
19th century Canadian legislation, until the present time.

It is clear that

Canadian law from the beginning has always required an invention’s best mode
to be disclosed as a consequence of the statutory duty to correctly and fully
describe the operation and use of every invention. The later express inclusion
of a best mode duty for machines does not impliedly exclude the same duty
for all inventions. Contrary case law is therefore wrong and should be
overruled.

1. Introduction
Many newly minted patent agents are going into practice holding
the belief that a Canadian patent application need disclose the best

*

Professor of Intellectual Property Law, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto; Emeritus
Reuters Professor of Intellectual Property & Information Technology Law, University of Oxford. The
research assistance of Daniel Whalen, J.D. (Osgoode) ’13, articling with Smart &
Biggar/Fetherstonhaugh, is gratefully acknowledged, as are the helpful comments of Justice Roger T.
Hughes, Professor Norman Siebrasse, and my friend Ronald M. Lieberman. The views expressed are of
course solely the author’s. They were previewed on April 30 2013 on IP Osgoode’s blog:
http://www.iposgoode.ca/2013/04/must-every-canadian-patent-application-include-the-inventorsbest-mode-of-working-the-invention/.
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mode of working an invention for only one class of invention: a machine.1
If the application claims any other category of invention mentioned in
section 2 of the Patent Act – any “art, process, … composition of matter,
or manufacture”, or improvement thereof2 – the best mode of working or
making that invention need not be disclosed.
This view would logically hold even where non-machine claims
accompany a machine claim in the same application: the inventor may
withhold the best mode of working everything connected to his invention,
except whatever relates to the machine and its principle.
This paper argues that that the duty to disclose an invention’s best
mode in fact applies to all inventions.

The view that the duty is

restricted to machines is wrong and should be overruled at the earliest
opportunity.
Over 65 years ago Thorson P. said in Minerals Separation North
American Corp. v. Noranda Mines Ltd. that
the inventor must act uberrima fide and give all information known to him that
will enable the invention to be carried out to its best effect as contemplated
by him.3

1

Thus, candidates for the 2010 Patent Agent Examination were expected to answer “no” to a question
whether a specification claiming chemical compounds as the invention had to include the best method
of making the compound: “there is no requirement [for an inventor] to describe his best method of
making it. The ‘best mode’ requirement applies only to the application of a principle in respect of a
machine, as set out in s. 27(3)(c) of the Patent Act, and not in respect of a compound” (Patent Agent
Exam 2010 – Marking Guide B, Q. 13, at http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernetinternetopic.nsf/eng/wr02776.html#q13).
2

R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, s. 2, def. “invention”.

3

Minerals Separation North American Corp. v. Noranda Mines Ltd., [1947] Ex. C.R. 306 at 317, rev’d
on other grounds [1950] S.C.R. 36, aff’d (1952), 15 C.P.R. 133, 69 R.P.C. 81 (P.C.)

2
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Thorson P.’s view on best mode – the “best effect” as he put it, or
“preferred embodiment” as patent jargon sometimes has it – capped his
statement of the main elements of the duty of disclosure imposed by the
Patent Act. The entire statement has until very recently stood
unchallenged by courts, practitioners, and the Patent Office alike as an
authority applicable to all classes of invention.4 In dealing generally with
the duty to disclose in 1981, the Supreme Court in the leading case of
Consolboard Inc. v. MacMillan Bloedel (Sask.) Ltd.5 cited extracts from
Thorson, calling him “an authority in these matters.” On best mode Fox’s
standard text on patents accepted Thorson P.’s statement in saying that
the Patent Act required an inventor “to describe correctly and fully what
is his invention”, and that “necessarily involves the duty of disclosing the
best method of so doing as contemplated by him.”6

In its turn the

4

Ilsley Royal Commission on Patents, Copyright & Industrial Design, Report on Patents of Invention
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1960) at 44-45 setting out Thorson P.’s entire statement and saying the
Commission could not improve on it. Similarly I. Goldsmith, Patents of Invention (Agincourt, Ont.:
Carswell, 1981) at §161 n. 6 & A. MacRae, Inventions and Patents in Canadian Practice (Toronto:
Canada Law Book, 1954) at 73-75 both quote Thorson P.’s entire statement with apparent approval.
The current Manual of Patent Office Practice is however confusing. At § 9.02.01 It cites
Thorson
P.’s
full
statement
(http://www.cipo.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernetinternetopic.nsf/eng/wr03150.html#n9_02_02). Then at § 9.06 it sets out the current version of the
Patent Rules (SOR 96/423 as am.), which merely prescribe “at least one mode contemplated by the
inventor for carrying out the invention” (Rules, para. 80(1)(f)). This may suggest the “one” mode need
not be the “best”. But since a patent rule “cannot override a substantive legal requirement” (Eli Lilly
Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 2008 FC 142 at para. 173) those who do not disclose their best known mode
and rely on a narrow interpretation of para. 80(1)(f) are living dangerously.
Since nothing relevant in the Patent Act has changed since the earlier Patent Rules (SOR 78673), it seems wiser to follow the guidance of the older Rules, particularly Schedule 1 Form 24 as
prescribed by s. 21. Taking a product invention as their example, they required the specification to
include a “full description of the best way of using or putting into operation [its] inventive idea” (Form
24, para. (4)).
5

[1981] 1 S.C.R. 504 at 524.

6

H. Fox, Canadian Law & Practice relating to Letters Patent for Invention, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
1969) at 180. Similarly, Goldsmith, supra note 4 at §§ 161, 163, 177 & 178; MacRae, supra note 4 at 7375; D. Vaver, Intellectual Property: Copyright, Patents, Trade-marks, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2011) at 343-44.
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Federal Court of Appeal in 1981 in Lido Industrial Products Ltd. v.
Teledyne Industries Inc.7 accepted Fox’s view when asking whether or not
the duty to disclose best mode had been broken in respect of a nonmachine patent, and held on the facts that it had not.

Had no duty

existed at all, one would have expected the Court simply to say so
instead of undertaking an irrelevant inquiry.
How then has the contrary view that best mode applies only to
machines arisen? Why is it wrong? The rest of this paper is devoted to
answering these questions.
2. Restricting Best Mode: the Recent Decisions
In public policy terms, there is little reason why society should wish
to grant an exclusive right in return for the disclosure of an inventor’s
second- or third-best method of realizing an invention while letting him
keep the best to himself as a trade secret. The fact that no Canadian
patent seems to have been invalidated solely for failing to disclose the
invention’s best mode8 suggests the policy is working.

The practical

difficulty of demonstrating that the method disclosed is not in fact the
best then known to the inventor may also play a part but, given that the
penalty for non-compliance is invalidation of the patent, concealment
must be considered a high risk strategy for a duty with potentially low
patentee costs and high public benefit.

7

(1981), 57 C.P.R. (2d) 29 at 44-45 (Fed. C.A.) per Thurlow C.J.

8

One however did come close: Di Fiore v. Tardi, [1952] Ex. C.R. 149 at 155-56 ultimately holding a
patent invalid for insufficiency for more “important” reasons than the best mode failure in that case.

4
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Non-compliance may also have effects beyond Canada since
Canadian applications are often drafted in reliance on a corresponding
United States application that traditionally has also needed to disclose an
inventor’s best mode. But the United States has recently made best mode
a mere talking point between the applicant and a U.S. patent examiner,
instead of a ground of invalidation if the mode does not appear in the
issued patent,9 and European law has long lacked a best mode
requirement. The U.S. change was supposedly partly premised on a wish
to help unwary foreign inventors because, as a textbook coauthored by
the current Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals baldly
stated, “the United States is the only country with a best mode
requirement”.10 Such assertions overlooked best mode requirements in
Canada and Mexico as NAFTA partners, as well as in a number of
Commonwealth nations (e.g. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia,
Kenya, Tanzania, Namibia, Australia and New Zealand) and other
significant jurisdictions (e.g. Brazil, Mexico, Andean Pact members, Egypt
and Thailand).

Best mode is also commonly recommended as the

standard of disclosure for the patent laws of developing countries and is
the default rule under the Patent Co-operation Treaty.11 Filers of
9

Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 282(3), as am. by America Invents Act, P.L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), § 15.

10

M. Adelman, R. Rader & G. Klancnik, Patent Law (St Paul, MN: Thomson West, 2008) at 216; compare
L. Petherbridge & J. Rantanen, “The Pseudo-Elimination of Best Mode: Worst Possible Choice?” 59
U.C.L.A. L.Rev. Disc. 170 (2012) arguing that the new U.S. law helps ignorant foreign filers while
disadvantaging U.S. inventors who will disclose best mode from habit, with J. Forstner, “International
Implications of the U.S. Best Mode Requirement” 21 AIPLA Q’ly J. 157 at 165 (1993) claiming that little
best mode litigation involves foreign applicants.
11

UNCTAD, Development Dimensions of Intellectual Property in Indonesia: Access to Medicines,
Transfer of Technology & Competion (N.Y. & Geneva: United Nations, 2011) at 28-29; D. Carlson, K.
Przychodzen & P. Scamborova, “Patent Linchpin for the 21 st Century? – Best Mode Revisited” 87 Jo.
Pat. & Tm. Off. Soc’y 89 (2005); B. Lu, “Best mode Disclosure for Patent Applications: An International
& Comparative Perspective” (2011) 16 Jo. I.P.R. 409; Patent Co-operation Treaty, Rule 5.1(v)
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Canadian patents therefore still need to know whether they should
include or dispense with such a disclosure in their application, or beef up
the specification when preparing a draft based on an application from a
jurisdiction with little or no best mode enforcement.
Since most patent law ultimately rests on interpretations of the
Patent Act one naturally first turns there for answers. Subsection 27(3)
of the Act reads:
The specification of an invention must
(a) correctly and fully describe the invention and its operation or use as
contemplated by the inventor;
(b) set out clearly the various steps in a process, or the method of constructing,
making, compounding or using a machine, manufacture or composition of matter,
in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art or science to which it pertains, or with which it is most closely connected, to
make, construct, compound or use it;
(c) in the case of a machine, explain the principle of the machine and the best
mode in which the inventor has contemplated the application of that principle;
and
(d) in the case of a process, explain the necessary sequence, if any, of the various
steps, so as to distinguish the invention from other inventions. [emphasis added]

Paragraph (c) might suggest that one need disclose and explain the
best mode of working an invention only for machines, and in 2009 the

(www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/rules/r5.htm#_5); Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Annex 1C to the World Trade Organisation Agreement 1994, art. 29(1) (best mode
duty optional).

6
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Federal Court so ruled for the first time in Sanofi-Aventis Canada Inc. v.
Apotex Inc.:
Where Parliament has chosen to include a “best mode” obligation in respect of
machine patents only, the courts must respect that choice. Accordingly,
reading such a requirement into non-machine patents would be contrary to the
principles of statutory interpretation.12

Snider J. therefore held a patent for a medicinal compound need not
disclose the best mode of making or applying it.13 The Federal Court of
Appeal in one of the Viagra cases decided the following year specifically
approved the above passage in Sanofi-Aventis.14 Snider J. herself recently
reaffirmed her earlier ruling, rejecting an argument that claiming a
number of medical compounds required the inventor to disclose which of
them he thought best for the purpose.15

So Sanofi-Aventis and its

progeny continue as precedents until they are overruled.
Two preliminary observations may be made on this development.
First, apart from some reformatting and minor changes, subsection 27(3)
has stayed the same since its enactment in 1935.16 One therefore wonders

12

2009 FC 676 at para. 330.

13

Snider J. also held that a best mode duty was anyway not breached because the best mode known at
the Canadian filing date was unknown at the earlier filing date on which the Canadian application was
based, and the latter was the relevant time to test for best mode compliance (ibid. at para. 331).
14

Novopharm Ltd. v. Pfizer Canada Inc., [2012] 2 F.C.R. 69, 2010 FCA 242 at para. 72 (“Viagra”). In
reversing Viagra for other defects in the specification the Supreme Court of Canada said nothing about
the FCA’s best mode ruling: Teva Canada Ltd. v. Pfizer Canada Inc., 2012 SCC 60. The Supreme Court’s
ultimate decision on insufficiency has however been said to impose “a kind of best mode requirement”:
N.
Siebrasse,
“Disclosure
is
the
Quid
Pro
Quo”
http://www.sufficientdescription.com/2012/11/disclosure-is-quid-pro-quo.html.
15

Teva Canada Ltd. v. Novartis AG, 2013 FC 141 at para. 376.

16

Patent Act, 1935, 25-26 Geo. V, c. 32, subs. 35(1).

7

DRAFT for publication in (2013) Intellectual Property Journal

why, if the point taken in Sanofi-Aventis were good, it somehow escaped
Fox and the highly litigious patent bar for some 70 years. Second,
Parliament can and does do some pretty silly things but it is certainly
entitled to a presumption against silliness in its legislation. One therefore
also wonders why any legislature that believes in any form of best mode
disclosure for patents would be so addle-pated as to limit its application
to only one class of invention, and enigmatically of all those classes,
machines.

Why, for example, given the enormous importance the

Canadian Parliament has attached to health care patents for the best
part of a century, would it decide that disclosing an inventor’s best mode
of making or administering a medicine was not needed, while disclosing
his best method of working a machine for making hairclips or paper cups
was? Yet it is precisely in the field of medicine that the federal courts
have now decided that Parliament meant there to be no duty to disclose
the best mode of making or using the invention. Snider J. said she
thought the result was against “[c]ommon sense and fair play”17 but saw
no way out. Stulta lex, sed lex.
The research for this paper however strongly indicates that Thorson
P. in Minerals Separation and Fox were right after all. Sanofi-Aventis and
its followers were wrong in:
(a) not noticing that a proper interpretation of the duty in paragraph
27(3)(a) to “correctly and fully describe the invention and its operation or

17

Supra note 12 at para. 327.

8
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use as contemplated by the inventor” would include a duty to describe
the inventor’s best mode of operating or using the invention;18
(b) holding that the expression of a best-mode-for-machines duty in
paragraph 27(3)(c) impliedly excludes a best mode duty for all other
inventions;19
(c) discounting the significance of Minerals Separation and Consolboard in
interpreting subsection 27(3) and the best mode duty in paragraph
27(3)(a).
It may seem extraordinary that legislation that aims to stimulate
and protect advances in fields such as electronics and biotechnology can
be best understood today only by returning to its forebears at a time
when Watt was playing with steam and Volta with frogs. Yet, as Holmes
J. was fond of saying, “continuity with the past is not a duty, it is only a
necessity.”20 Many provisions in today’s Patent Act reflect the language
and concepts of patent law and policy of late 18th century Britain and the
18

Sanofi-Aventis omitted para. 27(3)(a) entirely when it set out subs. 27(3) (ibid. at para. 328). And
while the Viagra court (supra note 14 at para. 13) did set out all of subs. 27(3), it referred to para.
27(3)(a) only on another submission on disclosure (2010 FCA at para. 70). On best mode it merely
recorded the defendant’s submission (ibid. at para. 38, quoting Fox, supra note 4) and, after spending
25 paragraphs on other matters, returned to best mode (ibid. at paras. 72ff.) without noting that para.
27(3)(a) was critical on best mode too. This oversight vitiates its decision too and entitles the FCA to
overrule this part of Viagra: see R. v. George, [1966] S.C.R. 267 at 279 per Cartwright C.J. dissenting:
“I do not suggest that … the Court of Appeal … was ignorant of the existence of [the relevant statutory
provision] but …. I am satisfied that that section was not present to [its] mind when rendering
judgment, although it does appear to have been dealt with in the argument of counsel”, following
Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., [1944] K.B. 718 at 728-29 (C.A.).
19

See Bauer Nike Hockey Inc. v. Regan, 2001 FCT 1315 at [9]-[13] per Morneau Prothon., correctly
interpreting the relationship between the two paragraphs and refusing to strike an allegation of
invalidity based on a product patent’s failure to state the best known version of the product. Neither
Sanofi-Aventis (supra note 12) nor Viagra (supra note 14) cite this case.
20

R. Posner, ed., The Essential Holmes: Selections from the Letters, Speeches, Judicial Opinions, and
Other Writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1997) at 36 (letter to
Harold Laski, Mar. 15 1917).!

9
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United States, and early 19th century colonial Canada.

So it is with

subsection 27(3), and paragraph 27(3)(a) in particular, of the current
Patent Act of Canada. Bedrock principles established for patent law over
two centuries ago have remained constant despite the enormous
intervening changes in the social, industrial and legal order.
Whether these principles continue to serve a useful function is
however not the focus of this paper. Nor does it canvass whether
legislation should modify the principles or whether courts correctly
applied them in cases where they determined a best mode duty was
present. The concern is simply to establish that, until Parliament enacts
otherwise, current Canadian legislation does require a best mode duty to
be applied to all patented inventions.
The paper therefore starts by first examining the history of best
mode flowing from paragraph 27(3)(a), starting with its forerunner in the
British patent grant of the 18th century. It then traces the adoption of
the British law by comparable language in United States patent laws from
1793, and by pre- and post-Confederation Canadian patent laws since
1824.

These precursors of subsection 27(3) from the start were

consistently considered to include a best mode duty for all inventions
despite the addition in early U.S. and Canadian enactments of special
provisions for machines, the paradigm invention that drove the Industrial
Revolution during the late eighteenth through nineteenth centuries. The
review of Canadian law, especially since 1923, confirms the continued
presence of a general best mode duty for all inventions.

The paper

concludes by indicating where Sanofi-Aventis went wrong and how
subsection 27(3) is best interpreted.
10
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3. Best Mode Antecedents in British Law
In Britain, the link between best mode and the duty imposed by
paragraph 27(3)(a) to “correctly and fully describe the invention and its
operation or use as contemplated by the inventor” starts with the
language of the British patent grant in use from the early 18th century.
Because of the growing difficulty in discovering the nature of the
invention from the often meagre description in the patent itself, the law
officers who controlled the patenting process introduced into the
document a proviso that rendered the patent void if the inventor did not
particularly describe and ascertain the nature of his invention, and in what
manner the same is to be performed.21

A separate document containing the inventor’s description had to
be filed within a stated period of months in Chancery. It came to be
called a specification and was prefaced by language that recited the
patent proviso.22 The proviso, which was treated as a covenant or promise
by the patentee to the Crown, was later called by Lord Moulton a
“condition [that] is the foundation of modern Patent law”23 and became a
source for the “bargain” theory of patents so beloved of common law

21

Webster’s Patent Cases (1844), vi (“Web. P.C.”); Bailey v. Roberton (1878), 3 App. Cas. 1055 at 1074
aff’ing (1877), 4 S.C. 545 at 580 (Ct. Sess.); C. MacLeod, Inventing the Industrial Revolution: The
English Patent System, 1660-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni. Press, 1988) at 48ff.; Report from the
Select Committee on the Law relative to Patents for Invention (H.C., U.K., 12 June 1829) at 63.
22

See the form of patent and specification set out in W. Hindmarch, A Treatise on the Law relating to
Patent Privileges for the Sole Use of Inventions (London: Stevens, 1846) at 628 & 631 (patent) & 633
(specification). See also John Dolland’s specification of 1758 in 1 Carpmael’s Pat. Cas. 29; Richard
Arkwright’s patent of 1776 in Anon., Trial of a Cause Instituted by Richard Arden to Repeal a Patent
granted to Richard Arkwright (1785), 6-7 (patent), 8 (specification).
23

British United Shoe Machinery Co. Ltd. v. A. Fussell & Sons Ltd. (1908), 25 R.P.C. 631 at 650 (C.A.)
per Fletcher Moulton L.J.; see also Hindmarch, previous note at 70.
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courts to this day.24 The language of the proviso and the specification
was interpreted in light of its evident purpose: (i) to teach and enable
other workers to work the invention; (ii) to notify the public of what it
was not allowed to do during the patent term (a function today served by
claims); and (iii) to put the public in full possession of the invention once
the patent expired so that those with relevant skills could work it as fully
as the patentee could.25
The

inventor’s

duty

under

his

patent

and

specification

“particularly” to describe and ascertain his invention and how it
performed amply supported not just the general duty to disclose, but also
the particular duty to disclose the inventor’s best method of making and
using the invention.26

Neither duty always went down well with

inventors, who, while keen on having an exclusive right, were often less
so about letting competitors in on all the inventor knew in return. In
1847 one judge noted that the common mode of drawing a specification
was “to state, in some general language, what is the object of the
invention, and to point attention to the subject matter in such a manner
24

See, e.g., Teva, supra note 14 at paras. 32-35 & passim; compare D. Vaver, “Intellectual Property: Is
it Still a ‘Bargain’”? (2012) 24 I.P.J. 143.
25

Liardet v. Johnson (1778, K.B.) as reported in E. Hulme, “On the History of Patent Law in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries” (1902) 18 L.Q.R. 280 at 284ff.; Arkwright v. Nightingale
(1785), 1 Web. P.C. 60 at 61 (K.B.); R. v. Arkwright (1785), 1 Web. P.C. 64 at 66, 1 Carp. P.C. 53 at 76
& 78-9, aff’d ibid. at 101 (K.B.) (machine patent); Turner v. Winter (1787), 1 Web. P.C. 77 at 81-82
(K.B.) per Buller J. (dye-making patent); Select Committee Report, supra note 21 at 65 (evidence of
Francis Abbott); Hindmarch, supra note 22 at 156; Oxford History of the Laws of England (Oxford:
Oxford Uni. Press, 2010), vol. 13 at 950 (entry by W.R. Cornish).
26

Hindmarch, ibid. at 155-56, 159 & 165-172; H. Lund, A Treatise on the Substantive Law relating to
Letters Patent for Inventions (London: Sweet, 1851) at 100 & 121ff.; J. Collier, An Essay on the Law of
Patents for New Inventions, 2nd ed. (London: Longman & Rees, 1803) at 125ff.; W. Hands, The Law &
Practice of Patents for Inventions (London: W. Clark & Sons, 1808) at 8 & 10; Select Committee
Report, previous note at 63; J. Chitty, A Treatise of the Prerogatives of the Crown (London:
Butterworth, 1820) at 182-3 & 186-87; British United Shoe, supra note 22 at 650.
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as to give as little information as possible”.27
lawyer was even more direct.

An experienced patent

In giving evidence to a Select

Parliamentary Committee in 1829, Benjamin Rotch said that in his
experience:
in three cases out of four, it is the main object of the patentee to deceive the
public if he can, and nothing but the dread and fear of losing his patent
altogether keeps him constantly from imposing on the public a false
description…28

Lord Mansfield had nevertheless told inventors as far back as 1778
that their specifications must teach a person skilled in the art to make
the invention “and to make it as well as you by your directions.”29 What
that meant in practice is well illustrated by an early 19th century
infringement case in which a jury held a dye-making patent void for
having an insufficient specification.

The dye could be produced well

enough from what the specification disclosed but, for the presiding judge
Gibbs C.J., well enough was not good enough. He directed the jury that:
[a] man who applies for a patent, and possesses a mode of carrying on that
invention in the most beneficial manner, must disclose the means of producing
it in equal perfection, and with as little expence [sic] and labour as it costs the
inventor himself. The price that he pays for his patent is, that he will enable
27

Barber v. Grace (1847), 1 Exch. 339 at 345 per Pollock C.B. Pollock had been a law officer and
leader of the patent bar and sat on many patent cases after appointment.
28

Select Committee Report, supra note 21 at 107; see also ibid. at 44-45 (evidence of Arthur Aikin) &
63 (evidence of Francis Abbott). Specifications were nevertheless practically difficult to access because
they were randomly distributed uncatalogued among three offices that charged search fees even if the
document was located elsewhere: Report & Minutes of Evidence before the House of Lords Select
Committee on the Patent Amendment Bills (H.C., 4 July 1851) at 228-229.
29

Liardet, supra note 25 at 285 and the other authorities cited in this note; D. Brennan, “The Evolution
of English Patent Claims as Property Definers” [2005] I.P.Q. 361 at 369ff.
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the public, at the expiration of his privilege, to make it in the same way, and
with the same advantages. If anything which gives an advantageous operation
to the thing invented be concealed, the specification is void.30

It is true that the ground based on the wording of the patent
proviso or specification sometimes overlapped with what a Lord
Chancellor, charged with both sealing patents on the monarch’s behalf
and also enforcing them in Chancery, called “a principle of patent law,
that there must be the utmost good faith in the specification”.31 Any lie
that misled the Crown, whether deliberately or innocently,32 was a
ground to avoid the grant for false suggestion or misrepresentation.33
This defect was more than a matter of merely calling a specification
“insufficient”: a court could invalidate the patent on this ground of its
own accord without the point even being pleaded.34 Gibbs C.J. himself
based a failure of the best mode duty in his case on both grounds: a

30

Wood v. Zimmer (1815), 1 Holt (N.P.) 58 at 60 (K.B.); similarly Bovill v. Moore (1816), 1 Carp. P.C.
320 at 339-340 per Gibbs C.J., aff’d ibid. 348 (C.P.) (machine patent); Savory v. Price (11823), Ry. &
Mood. 1 at 3 (K.B); Heath v. Unwin (1852), 12 C.B. 522 at 550 (Ex. Ch.) per Coleridge J. (diss.), rev’d
(sub nom. Unwin v. Heath) (1855), 5 H.L.C. 505 at 542 per Pollock C.B. & 545-56 per Cranworth L.C.
(process patent).
31

Sturz v. De La Rue (1828), 5 Russ. 322 at 325 (L.C.) holding patent void (best mode was deliberately
concealed on the inventor’s instructions: Select Committee Report, supra note 21 at 107). The good
faith principle goes back earlier: see, e.g., Eldon L.C. who (when still C.J.) said that “patents were …
to be judged of on the principle of keeping good faith, by making a fair disclosure of the invention”:
Cartwright v. Amatt (1800, C.P.), noted in Select Committee Report, ibid. at 192.
32

Bovill, supra note 30 at 348 per Gibbs C.J.

33

Hindmarch, supra note 22 at 41-42 & 166-67; H. Fletcher Moulton, The Present Law & Practice
Relating to Letters Patent for Inventions (London: Butterworth, 1913) at 98.
34

Natural Colour Kinematograph Co. (in Liq.) v. Bioschemes Ltd. (1915), 32 R.P.C. 256 at 268-89
(H.L.) per Lord Parker, followed in McPhar Engineering Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Sharpe Instruments Ltd.
(1960), 35 C.P.R. 105 at 136-38 (Ex.) per Thorson P. in dealing with an allegation that a claim was
ambiguous or obscure.
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“prejudicial concealment” and a “breach of the terms which the
patentee makes with the public.”35
The grounds at common law and on the patent or specification were
nevertheless independent, and the good faith requirement could equally
flow

from

a

purposive

construction

of

the

inventor’s

duty

to

“particularly” describe the invention and its use. This ground based on
the language of the patent or specification – literally, part of the bargain
the patentee made with the Crown in exchange for the exclusive right –
gave courts the clearest authority for invalidating a patent for noncompliance. Insufficiency as a defence was invariably raised by pleading
that the plaintiff had not complied with the patent proviso. The plaintiff
then had to prove full and frank compliance or lose his case.36
The language of the patent proviso was moved into legislation in
185237 and the proviso itself was eventually changed to allow for
revocation on “any of the grounds from time to time by law
prescribed”.38 Thus from 1852 on, the new statutory language became

35

Wood, supra note 30 at 60. The dual grounds of decision were apparently recognized by H. Fisher &
R. Smart, Canadian Patent Law & Practice (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1914) at 78 & 198-9 referring
to Wood in connection with the statutory provisions on both disclosure and concealment.
36

Hornblower v. Boulton (1799), 8 T.R. 95 at 101 (K.B.); Morgan v. Seaward (1836), 1 Web. P.C. 170 at
173-75 (K.B.); Walton v. Bateman (1842), 1 Web. P.C. 613 at 621-23 (C.P.); Tetley v. Easton (1852),
Macrory’s Pat. Cas. 48 at 76 (Ex.); Heath (1852), supra note 30 at 523 & 550; Foxwell v. Bostock (1864)
4 De G.J. & S. 313-14 (L.C.); Bailey, supra note 21 (1877) at 580; Clark v. Adie (1877), 2 App. Cas. 315
at 333-34 & 340 (H.L.); Lund, supra note 26 at 100 & 121ff. For proof and pleading see Hindmarch,
supra note 22 at 475ff., 669-70 & 675-76; T. Turner, The Law of Patents & Registration of Invention &
Design in Manufacture (London: Crockford, 1851) at 38, 40-41 & 80; similarly on post-1852 pleading
Bullen & Leake’s Precedents of Pleading, 7th ed. (London: Stevens & Sweet & Maxwell, 1915) at 804-06
(although mixing statutory and common law grounds in the commentary).
37

Patent Law Amendment Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict., c. 85, s. 9 (U.K.) requiring the filing of a complete
specification “particularly describing and ascertaining the nature of the said invention, and in what
manner the same is to be performed”.
38

On later form of patents see Patent Rules, 1890, S.R. No. 950 (U.K.), Third Schedule, Form A.

15

DRAFT for publication in (2013) Intellectual Property Journal

the main source of the best mode obligation, on which the former case
law continued to be treated as authoritative.39

The requirement to

disclose the inventor’s “best method” was made explicit in the patent
statute of 1932 and remained so until the passage of the Patent Act 1977
(U.K.), when it disappeared on the U.K.’s joining the European Patent
Convention.40
The presence of an overlapping common law duty of honesty or
good faith is no doubt the reason for the occasional loose remark that the
general duty to disclose, and the specific duty to disclose best mode, are
rules of the common law.41 But the duty to disclose the invention in a
39

“It is expressly enacted that the patentee must, in the complete specification, describe the manner
in which the invention is to be performed, and the description will not be sufficient unless it includes
the best means known to him at the time of filing the document”: R. Frost, Law & Practice relating to
Letters Patent for Inventions, 2nd ed. (London: Steven & Hayes 1898) at 205ff. on the same language
carried into the Patents, Designs & Trade Marks Act, 1883 (U.K.), s. 5(4); similarly S. Brice The Law,
Practice, & Procedure, relating to Patents, Designs, & Trade Marks (London: Clowes, 1885) at 11; J.
Johnson, A Treatise on the Law & Practice of Patents for Invention, 6th ed. (London: Longmans,
Stevens, 1890) at 100 & 121-24; W. Bewes, Copyright, Patents, Designs, Trade Marks (London: A. & C.
Black) at 101-02; L. Edmunds, The Law & Practice of Letters Patent for Inventions, 2nd ed. (London:
Stevens, 1897) at 156ff.; Fletcher Moulton, supra note 33 at 85 & 96; J. Roberts, The Grant & Validity
of British Patents for Invention (London: John Murray (1903) at 72 & 74ff.; K. Swan, The Law &
Commercial Usage of Patents, Designs & Trade Marks (London: Archibald Constable, 1908) at 45-46, 53
& 59; D. Fulton, The Law & Practice relating to Patents & Designs, 4th ed. (London: Jordan, 1910) at 96
& 99-100; Penn v. Bibby (1866), L.R. 2 Ch. App. 127 at 132 per Lord Chelmsford; Plimpton v.
Malcolmson (1878), 3 Ch. D. 351 at 536, 580 & 582; British Dynamite Co. v. Krebs (1879), 13 R.P.C. 190
at 192 (H.L.) per Cairns L.C. (referring to Act) & 195 & 196 per Lord Hatherley; Edison v. Woodhouse
(1886) 32 Ch. D. 520 at 523; Siddell v. Vickers (1887), 39 Ch. D. 92 at 104 (C.A.), aff’d (1890), 15 App.
Cas. 496 (H.L.); Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. East London Rubber Co. (1896), 14 R.P.C. 77 at 101 (Ch.), aff’d
ibid. 573 (C.A.); British United Shoe, supra note 23 at 650; R.C.A. Photophone Ltd. v. Gaumont-British
Picture Corp. (1936), 53 R.P.C. 167 at 195 (C.A.) per Romer L.J.
40

Patents & Designs Act, 1932 (U.K.), s. 3; Patent Act, 1949 (U.K.), s. 32(1)(h); see Terrell on the Law
of Patents, 12th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1971) at para. 226.
41

See, e.g., in Canada, Fisher & Smart, supra note 35 at 198; De Forest Phonofilm of Canada Ltd. v.
Famous Players Canada Corp., [1931] Ex. C.R. 27 at 43 per Maclean P. on predecessors of paras.
27(3)(a) &(b) (“This was an obligation of the Common Law and it is now an obligation by Statute”);
Fox, supra note 4 at 180 on best mode in para. 27(3)(a) (“At common law a patent was always held
invalid … if he failed to communicate all his knowledge with respect to the invention”), as cited by
Lido, supra note 7; Consolboard, supra note 5 at 518 per Dickson J. (changes to subs. 27(3) “merely
gave statutory recognition to what had always been the common law”) [emphasis added throughout].
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specification was not imposed by the common law, and so no “common
law” of specifications or patent provisos ever existed in the way a judgemade common law of contracts and torts did – any more than there has
been

a

“common

law”

of

obviousness,

anticipation

or

patent

infringement, despite the enormous body of case law on these concepts
that nevertheless firmly rested on legislation or the words of the patent
grant.42 As the old rules of pleading and evidence clearly recognized,43
the duties of disclosure and best mode were best based on the language
of the patent proviso and specification. A decision on the meaning of a
power or provision in a statute or deed does not become part of the
“common law” just because a common law-trained judge delivers or
deduces it, or common law principles are applied to interpret the
instrument’s language or the consequences of non-compliance with its
provisions.44
If a best mode duty can therefore be drawn from the proviso of the
British patent grant it should equally flow from the language of paragraph
27(3)(a) of the Canadian Act. The principle of the proviso as interpreted
by the British judges is equally that of the Canadian paragraph. Although
paraphrase is normally frowned on as a method of interpretation,
exceptionally it works here, as the Supreme Court of Canada seems to
have recognized in 1930 in equating compliance with the British patent
42

Synthon B.V. v. SmithKline Beecham plc, [2006] 1 All E.R. 685, [2005] UKHL 59 at paras. 57-58 per
Lord Walker, cited in part and approved in Apotex Inc. v.Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc., [2008] 3
S.C.R. 265, 2008 SCC 61 at para. 12 per Rothstein J.
43

Hindmarch, supra note 22 at 475ff., 669-70 & 675-76.

44

Whether a duty was based on common law or statute became important in Britain only after 1949
when common law grounds could no longer be used to revoke a patent: Patent Act, 1949 (U.K.), s.
32(1); American Cyanamid Co. v. Upjohn Co., [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1507 at 1510-11 (H.L.) per Lord Reid.
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proviso with compliance with another aspect of subsection 27(3).45
Conceptually and functionally the Canadian duty to “correctly and fully
describe the invention” is no different from the British duty to
“particularly describe and ascertain the nature of his invention”; the
Canadian duty to “correctly and fully describe [the invention’s] operation
or use as contemplated by the inventor” must equally be the same as the
duty undertaken by the inventor to “particularly describe and ascertain …
in what manner the [invention] is to be performed”.
Nothing in the Canadian Act points to a different conclusion –
including

the

presence

of

the

best-mode-for-machines

paragraph

27(3)(c). This becomes clear as we trace the importation of British law
into American law, and the migration of the American provisions into the
forerunners of Canadian paragraphs 27(3)(a) and (c).
4. Best Mode in American Law
The first patent law of the United States in 1790 amounted to only
one section although a longer and more expansive one than its inspiration
in section 6 of the Statute against Monopolies of 1624,46 the only patent
legislation Britain then had. An inventor who successfully petitioned the
government with the assertion of a “sufficiently useful and important”
invention or discovery would receive a patent that “recit[ed] the
allegations and suggestions of the said petition, and describ[ed] the said

45

French’s Complex Ore Reduction Co. of Canada v. Electrolytic Zinc Process Co., [1930] S.C.R. 462 at
476 per Rinfret J. citing from Lord Halsbury in British Ore Concentration Syndicate Ltd. v. Minerals
Separation Ltd. (1909), 27 R.P.C. 33 at 47 (H.L.).
46

21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.).
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invention or discovery clearly, truly and fully”.47 Inventors’ complaints
and the administrative burden of dealing with and rejecting around half
of the 120 petitions presented under the 1790 law caused a new statute
to be enacted in 1793 that more clearly set out what paperwork was
needed for registration.48

Not only did the inventor have to supply

drawings, specimens and (on request) models, but by § 3 he also had to
deliver a written description of his invention, and of the manner of using, or
process of compounding the same, in such full, clear and exact terms, as to
distinguish the same from all other things before known, and to enable any
person skilled in the art or science, of which it is a branch, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make, compound, and use the same.

This primary obligation was followed by one contained in a second
sentence which imposed a more specific duty for machines. The inventor
had to disclose not just his best mode but “the several modes” of working
his machine, thus:
And in the case of any machine, he shall fully explain the principle, and the
several modes in which he has contemplated the application of that principle
or character, by which it may be distinguished from other inventions…

This several-modes duty was clearly additional to the one contained
in the prior sentence. The machine inventor was not absolved by the
several-modes duty from delivering a “written description” of the
machine and “the manner of using” it “in such full, clear and exact
terms” etc.
47

Patent Act, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).

48

Patent Act, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318-323, § 1 (1793). See O. Bracha, Owning Ideas: A History of AngloAmerican Intellectual Property (Harvard S.J.D. Dissert., 2005) at 414; D. Maxey, “Samuel Hopkins, the
Holder of the First U.S. Patent: A Study of Failure” 122 Penn. Mag. Hist. & Biog. 3 at 8 (1998).
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Nearly two centuries later when examining the current Canadian
version of § 3 of the 1793 U.S. Act, Dickson J. for the Supreme Court of
Canada criticized it for not being “happily phrased” and giving “the
impression of a mélange of ideas gathered at random rather than an
attempt to enunciate, clearly and concisely, a governing principle or
principles.”49

He thought the defect could be the result of multiple

amendments over the years; but the problem plainly existed from the
start.

Commentators on the 1793 Act noted it while more clearly

discerning the provision’s pattern.

Thus Phillips in his 1837 treatise

mentioned, in words reminiscent of Dickson J.’s “mélange of ideas”
remark, how the 1793 requisites were “blended and intermixed” but
emphasized the dominance of § 3’s opening language: “it is by observing
the first of these requisitions” – i.e., the duty to deliver a written
description in full, clear and exact terms – “that the latter are complied
with”, and “what is said of one requisite, is, in many instances, equally
applicable to another”.50
These provisions remained much the same when the U.S. Act was
revised in 1836 to create a system of examination, except that the
several-modes-for-machine provision in a renumbered § 6 became part of
the earlier sentence, separated by a semi-colon rather than a period.51
The change of punctuation indicated no change in meaning: the
conjunction “and” indicated that the special duty for machines was

49

Consolboard, supra note 5 at 518.

50

W. Phillips, The Law of Patents for Inventions (Boston: American Stationers’ Co., 1837) at 237-38.

51

Patent Act, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
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additional to the duties for machines and other inventions expressed in
the preceding language.
Machines were likely singled out for special treatment because they
were the prototypical invention of the Industrial Revolution of the late
18th and early 19th centuries, and petitions for their patenting under the
1790 law may have been disproportionately unsatisfactory.52 The
requirement that their several known modes of working – and not just
their best mode – be fully explained was thought to add to what was
required for other inventions by the good faith duty to describe any
invention in “full, clear and exact terms”.53
What is clear is that if an inventor had several modes of working the
machine’s principle, he could not avoid also saying which was or were his
best.

Since that duty was not expressed in the machine provision, it

could come only from the earlier language that required the invention
and its manner of use to be described in such “full, clear and exact
terms” as would enable a skilled worker to use it as well.54

In other

words, this primary duty must have applied as fully to machines as it
applied to other inventions.
52

A. Pottage & B. Sherman, Figures of Invention: A History of Modern Patent Law (Oxford: Oxford Uni.
Press, 2010) at 14 indicating that the machine was the “central case” for the development of specific
rules for patents throughout the 19th century, and most U.S. patent litigation in the first part of the
century “concerned mechanical devices”.
53

Sargent v. Carter (1857), 21 F. Cas. 495 at 497 (C.C.D. Mass.) per Curtis J. saying of a patented
machine that the inventor “describes two devices. If he was then possessed of a third, he was bound to
describe that also”.
54

J. Anderegg, “The Best Mode Requirement of 35 U.S.C. Section 112” 6 APLA Q’ly J. 219 at 220-21
(1978) rests best mode on the statutory codification of the common law duty, stemming from § 6 in the
1793 Act through later Acts, to tell the whole truth and not deceptively conceal anything “relative to
his discovery”. But the overlapping duty in §6 not to lie is conceptually distinct from the duty in §3
fully to disclose: see text accompanying supra notes 30-36; Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218 at 247
(1832).
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We have until now assumed that the British approach of
interpreting the language of the primary duty to include best mode was
followed in the United States, and indeed it was.55

American lawyers

understood that the disclosure section, like much else in the U.S. statute,
was inspired by the old Statute against Monopolies of 1624 and the
wording of the patent grant as interpreted by British case law, which by
1793, and even more so by 1836, had established a best mode
requirement for all inventions. Thus, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph
Story, later hailed as “one of the architects of American patent law”,56
wrote in a paper published in 1818:
The patent acts of the United States are, in a great degree, founded on the
principles and usages which have grown out of the [Statute against Monopolies]
on the same subject. It may be useful, therefore, to collect together the cases
which have been adjudged in England, with a view to illustrate the
corresponding provisions of our laws.57

Story proceeded to do just that by setting out the provisions of the
Statute

against

Monopolies

and

the

British

patent

proviso

on

specifications and discussing the English decisions, which he perceptively
recognized as made “[u]pon the construction of the British patent act,
taken in connection with the conditions inserted in the letters patent.”
Among the decisions discussed were of course the English judgments on
55

Magic Ruffle Co. v. Douglas, 16 F. Cas. 394 at 397 (C.C.S.D.N.Y., 1863) (article of manufacture).

56

F. Prager, “The Influence of Mr. Justice Story on American Patent Law” 5 Am. Jo. Legal History 254
(1961).
57

J. Story, “Of the Patent Laws”, in 3 U.S. (Wheaton) Reps. (1818), Appendix (Note II), 13 (although
anonymous, Story J.’s authorship is confirmed by his son: W. Story, ed., Life & Letters of Joseph Story
(Boston: Little & Brown, 1851), vol. 1 at 303; see also Prager, previous note at 254, n. 1); see too E.
Waterscheid, “The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part I)” 75 Jo. Pat. &
Tm. Off. Soc’y 697 at 698-99 (1994) .
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best mode.58 The clear inference, acted on by Story J. in his many patent
judgments, was that American law and practice should generally follow
British law and practice in interpreting the U.S. statutes except where
the latter took a different tack.
That too was the view of the leading treatise writers. Phillips in his
book on the 1793 Act included a section headed “The specification must
direct how to make, and describe the best way known to the Inventor of
making, the article”59 and discussed the British case law, including that
dealing with machine inventions, with no hint that machines were
somehow exempt from the duty in the United States. In fact, Phillips
thought § 3’s several-modes-for-machine provision was of so little
importance that, after including it when setting out § 3 verbatim, he did
not refer to it again in his treatise.
Curtis’s treatise on the 1836 Act is more explicit. In passages
retained in all editions from 1849 to 1873, Curtis cited the relevant parts
of § 6 of the 1836 Act and went on to approve the English cases, including
Gibbs C.J.’s dye-making case,60 as exemplifying the inventor’s duty to
describe the invention so that it could be practised from the specification
alone:
58

See Story J., ibid. at 13-14 & 20-21. Story J. repeated and applied these views in Pennock v.
Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 at 18 (1829) (prior use); see too U.S. House of Representatives Comm.
debate on Patents Bill of 1793, Annals of the Congress of the United States, vol. 3 at 853 (Jan. 30
1793), by Mr Williamson (“the principles of the bill [were] an imitation of the Patent System of Great
Britain”); Senate Report Accompanying Senate Bill No. 239, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 28, 1836);
Bracha, supra note 48 at 415-16. Note that Hindmarch’s leading English patent treatise (1846), supra
note 22, was reprinted and published the following year in the U.S. by McKinley & Lescure, Harrisburg,
Pa., with an added Appendix of current U.S. patent statutes and notes of U.S. patent cases.
59

Phillips, supra note 50 at 282.

60

Wood, supra note 30.
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the patentee is bound to give the most advantageous mode known to him, and
any circumstance conducive to the advantageous operation; otherwise he does
not pay the price for his monopoly, because he does not give the public the
benefit of all that he knows himself. … [I]t is necessary that a specification
should … give the best process, materials, and methods, known to the
inventor…”61

After citing the several-modes-for-machine sentence, he made it
plain that the duty to disclose several modes was in addition to the
primary duty to disclose the machine’s best mode:
[H]e is to state not only the peculiar device or construction which he deems
best for producing the new effect exhibited in his machine, but also all the
other modes of producing the same effect, which he means to claim as being
substantially applications of the same principle.62

Two cases under the 1836 Act on machine improvement patents
bear Curtis out. The first claimed improvements to a cotton gin that left
greater spaces between the machine’s ribs to avoid clogging, and then
gave three ways to achieve that spacing. Story J. said the inventor need
not specify further how the three ways could be implemented: it sufficed
“for him to state the modes which he contemplates to be best.”63
The second case also involved a machine patent, an improved
portable sawmill, and the judge drew no distinction between machine
and other inventions in his direction to the jury:

61

G.T. Curtis, A Treatise on the Law of Patents for Useful Inventions in the U.S.A. (Boston: Little &
Brown, 1849) at 166 & 170.
62

Ibid. at 148-49.

63

Carver v. Braintree Mfg. Co., 5 F. Cas. 235 at 238 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843).
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The patentee is bound to disclose in his specifications the best method of
working his machine known to him at the time of his application. The
specification is intended to teach the public the improvement patented; it
must fully disclose the secret [and] must give the best mode known to the
inventor…64

When a new Patent Act was enacted in 1870, it repeated the
specification provision but the several-modes-for-machine sentence was
now replaced by a best-mode-for-machine provision:
and in case of a machine, he shall explain the principle thereof, and the best
mode in which he has contemplated applying that principle so as to distinguish
it from other inventions…65

The purpose of the amendment was not to impose for the first time
a best mode duty for machine patents. On the contrary, it confirmed the
holdings of prior case law that machine inventors were subject to that
duty under the general provision to describe the invention and its use in
“full, clear and exact terms”. The amendment’s evident purpose was
rather to remove the special duty on machine inventors to disclose not
merely the best mode but also “the several modes” for working the
machine invention.66 Machines were now put on a par with all the other
sorts of significant inventions that were making their presence felt on the
patents register.
In other words, after 1870 the best mode requirement continued as
before for all inventions and, for the avoidance of doubt, machine
64

Page v. Ferry, 18 F. Cas. 979 at 984 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1857).

65

Patent Act, c. 230, 16 Stat. 198, § 26 (1870) [emphasis added].

66

Thus overruling Sargent, supra note 53.
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inventions too were made subject to that same duty. No case law or text
writer suggested that restricting machine inventors to a best mode duty
somehow impliedly repealed the best mode duty for all other inventions.
The best mode duty continued to be discussed and applied, including by
the Patent Office,67 in terms that applied to all inventions without
discrimination.68
The drafting anomaly was finally removed by Congress in its
comprehensive revision of the U.S. Patent Act in 1952. The best mode
requirement was explicitly imposed on all inventions and the special
machine provision was dropped as now “unnecessary.”69
5. Best Mode in Canadian Law
The drafting anomaly the U.S. removed in 1952 remains in Canadian
legislation despite the Ilsley Royal Commission’s recommendations in
1960 to amend the Canadian Act in line with the U.S. reform.70 Canada’s
67

See Patent Rule 35 under the 1870 Act in E.J. Stoddard, Annotated Rules of Practice in the United
States Patent Office (Detroit: Drake, 1920) at 62-63: “The specification must set forth the precise
invention for which a patent is solicited, and explain the principle thereof, and the best mode in which
the applicant has contemplated applying that principle, in such manner as to distinguish it from other
inventions” (emphasis added).
68

Lorillard v. McDowell, 15 F. Cas. 893 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1877) (product); Grier v. Castle, 17 F. Cas. 523
at 524 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1883) (product improvement); Anderegg, supra note 54 at 222; W. Simonds, A
Summary of the Law of Patents for Useful Inventions (New York, N.Y: Strouse & Co., 1883) at 136-37 &
W. Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions (Boston: Little Brown, 1890), vol. 2 at §§ 484-86
& 498 both applying the English case law to all inventions; similarly O. Bump, The Law of Patents,
Trade-marks, Labels & Copy-Rights, 2d ed. (Baltimore: Cushings & Bailey, 1884) at 139; B.V. Abbott,
The Patent Laws of All Nations (Washington, D.C.: Brodrix, 1886), vol. 2 at 68; W. Elfreth, Patents,
Copyrights, & Trade-Marks (New York: Baker Voorhis, 1913) at 53-54; J. Waite, Patent Law (Princeton:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1920) at 170.
69

House Committee on the Judiciary, Proposed Revision & Amendment of the Patent Laws, Preliminary
Draft, Notes, § 28 (U.S. Govt. Printing Off., 1950); Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
70

Royal Commission, supra note 4 at 44-45 also setting out Thorson P.’s entire Minerals Separation
statement on disclosure as indicating what a suggested redraft of the Patent Act meant to achieve.
There is no suggestion that the redraft intended to change the law.
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current substantive legal position on best mode is nevertheless the same
as that reached by U.S. law since 1870 and confirmed by the 1952 U.S.
amendment. Canadian statutes on best mode followed a similar path to
the U.S. statutes, albeit sometimes with a significant time lag. The only
variation simply confirms a universal best mode duty.
In Consolboard the Supreme Court of Canada traced the history of
patent specifications back to Canada’s first patent statute of 1869, based
on the U.S. Patent Act of 1836.71 American influence however goes back
well before Confederation to the first patent legislation of Lower and
Upper Canada in 1824 and 1826 and the maritime colonies in the 1830s
which drew heavily on the U.S. Patent Act of 1793.

The written

description and separate several-modes-for-machine provision was taken
by Lower and Upper Canada and Nova Scotia almost word for word.72
Others like New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island in 1834 and 183773
applied the requirement to “explain the principle and the several modes
in which [the inventor has] contemplated the application of that principle
or character” to all inventions,74 and Nova Scotia in 1851 also removed
the “several modes” language from machines and required only the
machine’s “principle to be explained”.75 The Province of Canada in 1859

71

Supra note 5 at 518.

72

An Act to promote the progress of useful arts in this Province, L.C. 1824, 5 Geo IV, c. 25; An Act to
Encourage the Progress of Useful Arts within this Province, U.C. 1826, 7 Geo IV, c. 5, s. 3. An Act for
granting Patents for useful Inventions, S.N.S. 1833, c. 44, s. 7. For a list of the amendments to the
pre-Confederation statutes, see Fisher & Smart, supra note 35 at 2-3.
73

An Act for granting patents for useful Inventions, R.S.P.E.I. 1837, 7 Will. IV, c. 21, s. 6.

74

An Act for granting Patents for Useful Inventions, R.S.N.B. 1834, 26 Geo. 4 , c. 27, s. 6.

75

Of Patents for Useful Inventions, R.S.N.S. 1851, c. 120, s. 7.
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just largely copied the 1836 U.S. Act including its several-modes-formachine clause.76
The Dominion of Canada’s first Patent Act in 1869 was also modeled
on the 1836 U.S. Act with a few variations.

The specification’s

description had to be in “full, clear and exact terms” and also had to
“correctly and fully describe the mode or modes of operating
contemplated by the applicant” for all inventions. The redundancy of the
1869 Act’s retention of a provision for machines that required a full
explanation of “the several modes in which it is intended to apply and
work out” the machine’s principle apparently went unnoticed.77
These provisions continued with minor stylistic variations through
amendments and consolidations of Canada’s patent laws until the reforms
of 1923; but the more things changed, the more things stayed the same.
All the Canadian statutes since the 1820s were written against the
backdrop of British and American treatises and case law, which were
treated as authoritative in Canada. Thus Fisher and Smart in their 1914
treatise said the Canadian specification requirements were “in substance
the same as in England and the United States, although differing
somewhat in terms”.78 Those terms nonetheless included a duty imposed
76

An Act respecting Patents for Inventions, C.S.C. 1859, 22 Vict., c. 34, s. 7 & subs. 7(2). For the early
history of U.S. and Canadian cross-border technology transfer and tensions, see R.T. Naylor, The
History
of
Canadian
Business
1867-1914,
2nd
ed.
(Montreal
&
Kingston:
McGillQueen’s Univ. Press, 2006), c. 10, “Patents, Foreign Technology, and Industrial Development”.
77

An Act respecting Patents of Invention, S.C. 1869, 32-33 Vict., c. 11, s. 14.

78

Supra note 35 at 75; see also ibid. at 78 citing Turner, supra note 25, Sturz, supra note 31, & Wood,
supra note 30, after noting both the statutory requirements of the then patent laws of the U.S. (1870)
and the U.K. (1883); Smith Incubator Co. v. Seiling, [1937] S.C.R. 251 at 253-55 per Duff C.J. also
indicating overlap between common law and statute; Emery v. Iredale (1861), 11 U.C.C.P. 106, 1861
CarswellOnt 214 at paras. 20ff. noting the different respective wording of the English and Upper
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on inventors “in the public interest” to reveal “the best manner known to
the inventor of performing” the invention as part of the “condition … that
he has disclosed completely his invention”: so said the Supreme Court of
Canada when reviewing “some long established and well understood
principles of patent law”.79
Nobody doubted that, despite all the legislative tinkering, the
statutory duty applied across the board to machines as much as to any
other invention. Thus Ridout in his 1894 treatise wrote that the inclusion
of the several-modes-for-machine provision did not
necessarily mean that all alternate modes of operation are to be illustrated and
described, for there might be many; the best method of applying and working
out the principle is the one to be described.80

A universal best mode duty was particularly important for Canada
because of some special features of its early legislation that were not
always present in American or British law. First, Canada allowed patents
to be used by the government without the patentee’s consent, although
he was entitled to reasonable compensation as fixed by the Commissioner
of Patents.81 Second, the Canadian Acts required early local working of
Canada patents but drawing no distinction between them and Britain’s and Upper Canada’s law on
specifications.
79

Western Electric Co., Inc. v. Baldwin International Radio of Canada, [1934] S.C.R. 570 at 571 & 57374 per Duff C.J. speaking of combination patents granted in 1915 and 1916 (one being reissued in 1921)
and thus referring to the Patent Act, R.S. 1906, c. 61 with its several-modes-for-machine provision in
subs. 13(3).
80

J. Ridout, Treatise on the Patent Law of the Dominion of Canada (Toronto: Rowsell &
Hutchison,1894) at 106 [emphasis added], on Patent Act, S.C. 1886, 35 Vic. c. 26, subs. 13(3), although
failing to note that his view was contrary to the U.S. case of Sargent, supra note 53, which appears
nowhere in his book.
81

See, e.g., Patents Act, 1869, supra note 77, s. 21.
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patents by invalidating those which after 18 months relied on imports or
after 2 years were not locally worked to meet public demand.82

This

requirement, extending beyond machines to manufactures as well, was
supplemented in 1903 by a system of compulsory licensing that allowed
anyone to apply to the Commissioner of Patents to work the patent on
terms fixed by the Commissioner, where the reasonable requirements of
the public for the invention were not being met.83

These provisions

applied across to the board to all patented products and processes as well
as machines. They were progressively eliminated over the course of the
20th century, but while in force their purpose was evident: to make
inventions quickly available to the Canadian public at a reasonable price
or royalty and to ensure that “Canadian industry and Canadian labor
should, in the shortest possible time, be made to profit by new
inventions”.84

Those objects would have been seriously undermined if

third party use could start only below the best mode the inventor had
achieved when the patent had been applied for.
The general extent of the best mode duty was further reinforced by
the patent reforms of 1923.

The Patent Act of that year eliminated the

several-modes-for-machine provision but did not replace it with a bestmode-for-machine provision as contained in the 1870 U.S. Act. Instead
the new Canadian Act just said:
14.(1) The specification shall correctly and fully describe the invention and its
operation or use as contemplated by the inventor. It shall set forth clearly the
82

Ibid., s. 28.

83

An Act to amend the Patent Act, S.C. 1903, c. 46, 3 Edw. VII, s. 7.

84

Mayes v. R. (1877), 2 Ex. C.R. 403 at 484 & 485.
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various steps in a process, or the method of constructing, making or
compounding, a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.

The Parliamentary debates reveal an intention to keep Canadian
patent applications in line with U.S. and British practice,85 no doubt
because of the common traffic between Canada and those countries in
corresponding patent applications. The first sentence of subsection 14(1)
is certainly consistent with that intention. It returns to the simple
concept of the British patent grant and the prevailing interpretation of
the pre-1870 U.S. specification statutes that deduced a universal best
mode duty from comparable general language.
The presence of such a duty is also confirmed by the fact that three
sections later Parliament introduced new provisions, inspired by recent
British reforms, to limit patents over the critical areas of food, medicine
and their ingredients. If the substance intended for food or medicine was
prepared or produced by a chemical process, only the substance as
prepared by that process could be claimed. Parliament must have meant
these patents to be subject to the best mode provisions of subsection
14(1).

Since everyone was free to make the food or medicine by a

different non-infringing process, disclosing the best mode of the product
and process would encourage others to find better ways of making food
and medicine.86 The patents were also subject to compulsory licensing at
a royalty fixed by the Commissioner of Patents with regard to
85

Thus, on the Patent Bill’s second reading, a government amendment was put forward to subs. 14(2)
to simplify the requirement for signing the drawings that accompanied specifications “to conform with
the practice of Great Britain, the United States and other countries” (H.C. Debates, 14th Parl., 2d
Sess., 13-14 Geo V, Vol. 3 at 2073 (1923) by Mr Robb).
86

Dairy Foods Inc. v. Co-op. Agricole De Granby, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 651 at 663 per Dickson J.
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the desirability of making the food or medicine available to the public at the
lowest price consistent with giving to the inventor due reward for the research
87

leading to the invention.

The research leading to the invention would have included the best mode
both of working the process and also achieving the best version of the
food or medicine at the lowest price.

Requiring licensees to make

inferior or costlier products by inferior or costlier methods, while paying
a royalty based on the included cost of undisclosed best modes, would
have frustrated this purpose.
The legislative debates on the next round of patent reforms of 1935
do not reveal what, if anything, had broken that needed fixing. Doubts
may have arisen over the meaning of subsection 14(1) or pressure may
have mounted to copy the U.S. law of 1870 to standardize the contents of
specifications that were regularly being filed in both jurisdictions. In any
event, having removed one tautology in 1923, the Patent Act of 193588
introduced another by amending the specification provision again, this
time to include an explicit best-mode-for-machine provision:
35.(1) The applicant shall in the specification shall correctly and fully describe
the invention and its operation or use as contemplated by the inventor, and set
forth clearly the various steps in a process, or the method of constructing,
making, compounding, or using a machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art or science to which it appertains, or with which it is most
closely connected, to make, construct, compound or use it. In the case of a
87

Patent Act, S.C. 1923, 13-14 Geo. V, c. 23, subs. 17(2).

88

Supra note 16.
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machine he shall explain the principle thereof and the best mode in which he
has contemplated the application of that principle. In the case of a process he
shall explain the necessary sequence, if any, of the various steps, so as to
distinguish the invention from other inventions. [Emphasis added]

The emphasized language is with immaterial grammatical changes
taken verbatim from § 26 of the U.S. Patent Act 1870.

The whole

subsection is essentially today’s subsection 27(3), except that the latter
is divided into four paragraphs for ease of reading and reference.
Despite all the added verbiage the 1935 changes indicate no intent
to change the law on best mode as it stood both before and after the
1923 Act. By repeating the first sentence of the 1923 Act, the drafter
must have intended to retain the 1923 Act’s universal best mode duty.
He would equally have known that the addition of a best-mode-formachine duty would not affect the universal application of the best mode
duty in Canada any more than it had in the United States when § 26 of
the 1870 U.S. Act was enacted.

That was the result of Thorson P.’s

Minerals Separation decision on best mode under the 1923 Act, a view
that Thorson P. and other judges maintained under the 1935 and later
Acts.89

89

Minerals Separation, supra note 3; Di Fiore, supra note 8 at 154-56 (process patent under 1935 Act);
Radio Corp. of America v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., [1956-60] Ex. C.R. 98 at 108-9 per Thorson P. (method
patent); Traver Investments Inc. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., [1965] 2 Ex. C.R. 126 at 148 per
Gibson J. (method & apparatus patent), aff’d [1967] S.C.R. 196; Société des Usines Chimqiues Rhone
Poulenc v. Jules R. Gilbert (1967) 35 Fox P.C. 174 at 191-93 & 202 (Ex.) per Thurlow J. (process for
preparing medicine), aff’d [1968] S.C.R. 950; Jules R. Gilbert Ltd. v. Sandoz Patents Ltd. (1970) 64
C.P.R. 14, [1970] Ex. C.J. No. 1 at paras. 55ff. (process for preparing medicine), rev’d on other
grounds (sub nom. Sandoz Patents Ltd. v. Gilcross Ltd.) [1974] S.C.R. 1336; TRW Inc. v. Walbar of
Canada Inc. (1991), 39 C.P.R. (3d) 176 at 195-97 (Fed. C.A.) per Stone J.A. (method); Thomas & Betts,
Ltd. v. Panduit Corp. (1997), 74 C.P.R. (3d) 185 at 192 & 194 (Fed. T.D.) per Richard J., rev’d on other
grounds [2000] F.C. 3 (C.A.) (product); Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 2005 FC 1299 at para. 42
per Blanchard J. (medicine and dosage).
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Any idea that the introduction of the best-mode-for-machine
sentence impliedly repealed best mode for everything else is implausible.
The food and medicine provisions introduced in 1923 remained in the
1935 Act, and nothing indicates any Parliamentary intention then or since
to reverse the 1923 policy of applying best mode to them, despite their
later repeal and the introduction of different schemes to regulate access
to patented medicines.
Nor is implied repeal suggested from anything in the 1870 U.S. Act.
On the contrary, as noted earlier, the universal best mode duty was held
by treatise writers, the U.S. Patent Office, and court opinion to continue
under that Act despite the switch from the several-modes-for-machine
provision to the best-mode-for-machine one.90 Parliament could no doubt
have at any time copied the 1952 U.S. reform that explicitly made best
mode universal. Since a universal best mode duty was however already
generally understood to continue as before in Canada after the 1935
reforms, there was no pressure for yet further cosmetic tinkering merely
to confirm that understanding.
6. Sanofi-Aventis Revisited
The Federal Court of Appeal in Viagra endorsed Snider J.’s view in
Sanofi-Aventis that Minerals Separation’s statement applying best mode
universally was obiter, and that nothing in Minerals Separation or the

Almecon Industries Ltd. v. Anchortek Ltd., 2001 FCT 1404 at paras. 57ff. per Gibson J., aff’d
(sub nom. Anchortek Ltd. v. Almecon Industries Ltd.) 2003 FCA 168, is the rare example of an
application of para. 27(3)(c) to a “machine”, although the plastic seismic hole plug there seemed to
qualify more as a “manufacture”. No breach of duty was found.
90

Supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.

34

DRAFT for publication in (2013) Intellectual Property Journal

Supreme Court’s Consolboard decision required best mode to be applied
beyond machine inventions.91
The Court of Appeal is not bound to follow an Exchequer Court
decision, and Consolboard is indeed obiter on best mode.

But the view

that Minerals Separation was also obiter on best mode is incorrect, and
Consolboard was far more relevant to her case than Snider J. seemed to
realize.
(a) Minerals Separation and Consolboard Redux
Minerals Separation involved an allegation that a new process was
not disclosed sufficiently to comply with what is now subsection 27(3)(a) –
the 1923 version of the Act which lacked subsection 27(3)(c), the bestmode-for-machine provision.

Thorson P. made clear that, while his

statement of principle was based on decisions of prior Canadian and
English courts, he was in fact interpreting paragraph 27(3)(a). The
sentence in his judgment that
the inventor must act uberrima fide and give all information known to him that
will enable the invention to be carried out to its best effect as contemplated
by him

was followed by another indicating that the preceding statement referred
to
the extent to which the disclosures must go in describing the invention and its
operation or use as contemplated by the inventor, if the patent is not to fail
for either the ambiguity or insufficiency of such description.92

91

Viagra, supra note 14 at para. 72 approving Sanofi-Aventis, supra note 12 at para. 324.
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The italicized words indicate his view of what the duty in paragraph
27(3)(a), “to correctly and fully describe [the invention’s] operation or
use as contemplated by the inventor”, requires – a view that the
historical analysis above shows to be correct.
Although the point is somewhat obscured by his lengthy analysis of
other defences, Thorson P. did consider whether his inventor had
sufficiently disclosed the best mode of working the patented process of
using a new but unclaimed substance (xanthates), and concluded that he
had and that there was “no lack of good faith”.93 Thorson P. then held:
In my opinion, the inventor has correctly and fully described his invention in its
various aspects so that any person skilled in the froth flotation art would know
precisely what the inventor has found to be new and useful, primarily as his
best invention the use of the xanthates he defined, and also, on the ores
specified and within the limits stated, the use of the other substances
specified.94

He then rejected another best mode submission, that the specification
did not disclose the best method of making xanthates:
It was contended that in the course of the tests at Anaconda, in which
an acid circuit was used, the inventor had learned a better method of
preparing xanthate for use in an acid circuit than that described in paragraph 8
but had failed to disclose this useful knowledge. … [T]here are, I think, two
answers to [this contention]. The first is that the inventor did not have to
describe any method of preparing xanthate at all, since xanthate itself as a
92

Supra note 3 at 317 [emphasis added].

93

Ibid. at 336.

94

Ibid. at 346 [emphasis added].

36

DRAFT for publication in (2013) Intellectual Property Journal

new substance is not the subject of his invention. The second answer is that
there was no real chemical difference, having regard to the ingredients used,
between the method described in paragraph 8 and that used in the successful
test at Anaconda. …95

Thorson P. went on to dismiss the whole case based on nondisclosure under paragraph 27(3)(a). On the best mode point under that
paragraph, he said that the skilled reader was “directed to the use of the
best substance without any need for experimentation and can then deal
with the other substances found to be useful as he chooses under the
conditions mentioned”.96
Minerals Separation is therefore a holding that the best mode and
good faith duties exist for all inventions by virtue of paragraph 27(3)(a).
Thorson P. did not apply the duty to the chemical compound because the
compound was not claimed, but he did apply it to the chemical process,
which was claimed. Whether he was right or wrong in his application is
irrelevant for present purposes, except to notice that neither a
compound nor a process is of course a machine.
The Supreme Court in Consolboard approved another passage in
Thorson P.’s judgment, requiring that
when the period of monopoly has expired the public will be able, having only
the specification, to make the same successful use of the invention as the
inventor could at the time of his application.97

95

Ibid. at 351-52 [emphasis added].

96

Ibid.

97

Cited by Consolboard, supra note 5 at 520 [emphasis by Snider J.].
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While Snider J. quoted this passage and relied on the words above that
she emphasized,98 she could equally have emphasized the earlier part of
the sentence. For an insistence on a correct and full description, so that
when the period of monopoly has expired the public will be able, having only
the specification, to make the same successful use of the invention as the
inventor could

does indeed “import[..] a ‘best mode’ requirement”. How else can the
public make “the same successful use of the invention as the inventor
could” if the inventor gave just some second-best option that he had
moved on from by the time he filed his patent application? That point
has been the justification for a best mode duty since the 18th century.99
While Dickson J.’s statement is obiter because best mode was not
in issue in Consolboard, there is obiter and obiter. The statement was
not casually tossed out but was a part of a “wider circle of analysis which
is obviously intended for guidance and which should be accepted as
authoritative” unless good reason exists to ignore it.100
(b) “To Express A Is To Exclude B”: A Shaky Concept Reexamined
The good reason for ignoring Consolboard must lie in Snider J.’s
insistence that her job was statutory interpretation and presumably not
the application of judicial comments that were inconsistent with it. Thus

98

Supra note 12 at para. 324.

99

Text accompanying supra note 25.

100

R. v. Henry, [2005] S.C.R. 609 at para. 57.
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her quotation from Thorson P. and Dickson J. is followed by an extract
from subsection 27(3) – omitting paragraph (a) – and the Supreme Court’s
judgment in Apotex Inc. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo Inc.101 on the importance of
sticking to the language of the Patent Act and not relying on judicial
glosses. Viagra too repeated this passage and stressed the “importance
of fidelity to the Act”.102
It is true that the words “best mode” refer only to “a machine” in
paragraph (c) and “best mode” does not appear in paragraph (a) at all.
Snider J. did not direct her judgment to paragraph (a) but might still
have reasoned that:
[w]here Parliament has chosen to include a "best mode" obligation in respect of
machine patents only, the courts must respect that choice. Accordingly,
reading such a requirement into non-machine patents would be contrary to the
principles of statutory interpretation.103

The unnamed “principles” of statutory interpretation presumably
boil down to the concept that “to express A is to exclude B” or expressio
unius est exclusio alterius in its ancient Latin form.
Consolboard’s

relevance,104

Snider

J.

failed

to

In rejecting

appreciate

that

Consolboard itself also dealt with the same “principle” not once but
twice, accepting it in one instance but rejecting it in the other. As will
shortly be seen, the reasons for rejection suggest the Consolboard court
101

Apotex, supra note 42 at para. 12, cited in Sanofi-Aventis, supra note 12 at para. 329.

102

Viagra, supra note 14 at para. 73.

103

Sanofi-Aventis, supra note 12 at para. 330.

104

Ibid. at para. 332 rejecting Consolboard, supra note 5, because it addressed “the issue of
sufficiency.” But the duty to disclose best mode is a part of the general duty of disclosure and thus
clearly an “issue of sufficiency”.
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would also have rejected the idea that the expression of a special best
mode duty for machines excluded a best mode duty for all other
inventions.
The implied exclusion concept, often called a “maxim”, may be less
a rule of law than a rule of language for it determines the meaning a text
can have, not what it does have.105

The concept applies most often

where the statute’s drafting is precise, coherent and consistent,106 when
it tends to elevate itself into a “principle”, “canon” or even “rule”. With
less virtuous drafting it tends to stay a “maxim” or slides into
“presumption” or mere “hint”. At worst the concept becomes a banality
that the spurious mystique of Latin otherwise obscures.107

One court

called it the “weakest and least reliable” of “the hints or examples of
common drafting practices”: “If I state that I have a pen, that does not
imply that I have no pencil (nor ruler nor eraser)”,108 let alone that you
do or do not have any or all of these implements. In such contexts the
“maxim” – like others of its ilk – has been called “shaky” and “often
perilous”,109 one that “hardly ever plays a useful role” but instead is

105

A. Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton Univ. Press, 2005) at 10709.
106

J. Keyes, “Expressio Unius: the Expression that Proves the Rule” (1989) 10 Statute L. Rev. 1 at 25.

107

$Speaking of the volenti non fit injuria maxim, Lord Esher M.R. said “if we put this maxim into plain
English, part of it is true” but generally “I detest the attempt to fetter the law by maxims. They are
almost invariably misleading; they are for the most part so large and general in their language that
they always include something which is really not intended to be included in them”: Yarmouth v.
France (1887), 19 Q.B.D. 647 at 653 (D.C.).$
108

R. v. C.K.W. (2005), 53 Alta L.R. (4th) 274, 2005 ABCA 446 at para. 61 per Côté J.A.

109

International Power Plc v. Healy, [2001] 1 W.L.R. 864, [2001] UKHL 20 at paras. 55 & 67 per Lord
Hoffmann.
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“almost always a means of stating a conclusion.”110 For by expressing A, I
may not mean to exclude B at all; indeed, I may be content to let A and B
overlap and co-exist.
A quick review of decided cases that cite the implied exclusion
concept indicates that it is disregarded at least as often as it is applied
because the context in which it is invoked varies so widely. A statute
may be drafted precisely, coherently and consistently, or it may be
imprecise, incoherent, inconsistent or all three in varying degrees. The
concept’s value will decrease as the material with which it has to work
moves from the positive to the negative end of this spectrum. Such are
the realities of legislation and why the concept is often “merely a guide
to interpretation [that] does not pre-ordain conclusions”111 or apply
where it “leads to inconsistency or injustice”.112 It must be clear that the
express and tacit “cannot reasonably be intended to co-exist”,113 for one
must “realize that a general rule of interpretation is not always in the
mind of a draughtsman; that accidents occur; that there may be
inadvertence; that sometimes unnecessary expressions are introduced, ex

110

Bruce v. Cole, [1998] NSWSC 260 (N.S.W.C.A.) per Spigelman C.J. No U.S. legislature with an
interpretation statute includes the maxim and three reject it, prompting the comment that
interpreters “must do more work to justify the use” of such a tool: J. Scott, “Codified Canons and the
Common Law of Interpretation” 98 Georgetown L.J. 341 at 409 (2010).
111

Jones v. A.G. (N.B.), [1975] 2 S.C.R. 182 at 195-96 per Laskin C.J.

112

Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Police Commissioners, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311 at 322 per
Laskin C.J.
113

Ibid. citing Lowe v. Darling, [1906] 2 K.B. 772 at 785 (C.A.) as approved in Alliance
des Professeurs Catholiques de Montréal v. Quebec Labour Relations Board, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 140 at 154.
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abundanti cautela, by way of least resistance, to satisfy an insistent
interest, without any thought of limiting the general provision.”114
A nice example of the concept working mischief is A.G. for Quebec
v. Begin.115 One section of the Criminal Code provided that drunk driving
causing death was manslaughter.

Another later-added section made

impaired driving an offence and blood tests admissible if the accused had
been warned before testing of their admissibility. A person charged with
manslaughter argued that his blood test was inadmissible because he had
not been warned. The application of the implied exclusion concept might
make blood tests admissible only for impaired driving charges, and then
only on prior warning.

The court that so held was reversed by the

Supreme Court. Blood tests had earlier been admitted without warnings
in motor manslaughter cases, and the new impaired driving provisions
demonstrated no intent to cut down admissibility elsewhere. The Court’s
quote from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes is particularly apt:
Provisions sometimes found in statutes enacting imperfectly or for particular
cases only that which was already and more widely the law have occasionally
furnished ground for the contention that an intention to alter the general law
was to be inferred from the partial or limited enactment, resting on the
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. But that maxim is inapplicable in
such cases. The only inference which a Court can draw from such superfluous
provisions (which generally find a place in Acts to meet unfounded objections
and idle doubts), is that the Legislature was either ignorant or unmindful of the

114

Turgeon v. Dominion Bank, [1930] S.C.R. 67 at 70-71 per Newcombe J.; similarly Dorval v. Dorval
(2006), 285 Sask. R. 104, 2006 SKCA 21 at paras. 10-17 & 20 per Cameron J.A; Barak, supra note 105 at
109.
115

[1955] S.C.R. 593.
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real state of the law, or that it acted under the influence of excessive
caution.116

Maxwell’s words easily fit the case of paragraph 27(3)(a). In 1923
when subsection 27(3) had no explicit best-mode-for-machines provision,
paragraph 27(3)(a) was universally accepted as including a best mode
duty for all inventions. The addition in 1935 of a new best-mode-formachines paragraph – a “partial or limited enactment” – does not
therefore imply an intention to “alter the general law” of a universal best
mode duty. The opposite inference is more plausible in a statute where
precision, coherence and consistency are not conspicuously present: the
“superfluous provision” of best-mode-for-machines likely occurred to
“meet unfounded objections and idle doubts”. Although Parliament was
probably not “either ignorant or unmindful of the real state of the law”,
it likely “acted under the influence of excessive caution.”
This explanation is entirely consistent with how Consolboard dealt
with subsection 27(3). Although, just as in Sanofi-Aventis, the implied
exclusion concept was not mentioned by name, its influence was
apparent in the decisions of both the lower courts and the Supreme
Court.
Two of the points before the Supreme Court were whether the
Federal Court of Appeal had rightly held that:

116

Ibid. at 603 per Taschereau & Fauteux JJ. citing Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 9th ed.
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1953) at 318.
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(i) the duty in paragraph 27(2)(d) – to explain the sequence of steps in a
process “so as to distinguish the invention from other inventions” – did
not apply to non-process inventions; and
(ii) the duty in 27(3)(b) – to explain how the invention worked in terms
understandable by “any person skilled in the [relevant] art or science” –
did not apply to the duty (since repealed) in paragraph 27(3)(e),117 to
“particularly indicate and distinctly claim the part, improvement or
combination which he claims as his invention”.
The Supreme Court summarily agreed with the lower courts on point
(i): the paragraph’s interpretation had been watered down to virtual nonexistence over the years and the Court plainly saw no need to reverse this
trend and extend the provision beyond processes. In short, the implied
exclusion concept applied.118
The Supreme Court however disagreed with the Court of Appeal on
point (ii): the skilled person test in one paragraph was not excluded from
another paragraph just because it was not restated there expressly. The
lower court had in effect wrongly applied the implied exclusion concept
to reason that the requirement to disclose to a skilled person one
paragraph implied that disclosure in another must be directed to a nonskilled person, i.e., a member of the public at large. That interpretation
ran counter to a “well established principle” that specifications are
addressed to workers skilled in the art: the adoption of “different
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Consolboard, supra note 5 at 526-27 & 531-33.
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standards of disclosure for different parts” of the document was thus
wrong.119
The Supreme Court therefore held that the expression of a “well
established principle” in only one paragraph of subsection 27(3) does not
necessarily imply its exclusion elsewhere. The best mode standard is no
less well established than the skilled worker standard in issue in
Consolboard: both stem from and are indeed linked in two of the earliest
18th century English cases on patent infringement and revocation,120 and
both featured among the principles the Supreme Court in 1934 called
“long established and well understood.”121 One may therefore surmise
that the Consolboard Court would have been equally inclined to hold the
best mode duty applicable to all inventions despite the Act’s mentioning
it just for machines. Otherwise in a patent with separate claims for a
“machine” and its output (a “manufacture”), “different standards of
disclosure”

would

illogically

exist

“for

different

parts”

of

the

specification: a duty to disclose the best mode for the machine but
merely second- or third-best modes for the machine’s output.

119
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Liardet, supra note 25 at 285 per Lord Mansfield (1778): “you must specify upon record your
invention in such a way as shall teach an artist, when your term is out, to make it – and to make it as
well as by your directions. … The inventor has the benefit during the term, and the public have the
benefit after”; R. v. Arkwright, ibid. at 66 per Buller J. (1785): it is “clear law” that to be valid a
specification must: (1)”put the public in possession of the secret in as ample and beneficial a way as
the patentee himself uses it”, and (2) be “such that mechanical men of common understanding can
comprehend it”. Liardet’s patent was held valid and infringed, while Arkwright’s patent was revoked
for its deliberately defective specification: see further Brennan, supra note 29 at 369-72.
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Western Electric, supra note 79 at 571, 573 (skilled worker) & 573-574 (best mode) per Duff C.J. for
the Court.
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Significantly, the Court’s discriminating exercise in interpretation
occurred within a subsection that it called not “happily phrased”.122 We
earlier noted a passage from Dickson J.’s judgment for the Court when
reviewing the U.S. Patent Act of 1793.123 Snider J. did not mention this
passage at all. It is nevertheless worth quoting as it shows that Dickson
J. fully recognized that his task was to interpret a provision that he
called “the heart of the patent system”. But the disclosure subsection
was not the sort of precisely, coherently and consistently drawn provision
where guides such as the implied exclusion concept could be routinely
applied:
It gives the impression of a mélange of ideas gathered at random rather than
an attempt to enunciate, clearly and concisely, a governing principle or
principles. This is perhaps understandable in that the section is the product of
amendment over a period of many years. The language simply does not lend
itself to a tight, literal interpretation. It is, and should be treated as, a
parliamentary pronouncement, in general terms, of that which must be set
forth by the applicant to the world before being qualified to receive the grant
of monopoly under a patent.124

And after leafing through the provision’s forerunners back to 1869 and
the U.S. law of 1836, Dickson J. said of other additions made in 1935 to
the disclosure subsection:
It is not entirely clear what was intended to be achieved by the addition of the
quoted words. They may have been added ex abundante cautela, seeking
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greater particularity of description, but they appear to be little more than
pleonasm… It is not readily apparent that anything of substance was added in
1935 to that which had been required since 1869.125

The addition of the best-mode-for-machines provision in 1935
stands in the same position as the other provisions to which Dickson J.
alluded. If subsection 27(3) is approached with his words in mind, most
things in it fall neatly into place. Paragraph (a) would then be read, like
the old British patent grant and U.S. law, to state duties that apply to all
inventions. Paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) then simply provide examples of
the application of that primary duty, for caution’s sake or to avoid doubt.
On this reading, subsection 27(3) would be better understood if the
italicized words below were added at the end of paragraph (a):
(a) The specification of an invention must correctly and fully describe the
invention and its operation or use as contemplated by the inventor; and, in
particular, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, it must:
(b) set out clearly the various steps in a process, or the method of constructing,
making, compounding or using a machine, manufacture or composition of matter,
in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art or science to which it pertains, or with which it is most closely connected, to
make, construct, compound or use it;
(c) in the case of a machine, explain the principle of the machine and the best
mode in which the inventor has contemplated the application of that principle;
and
(d) in the case of a process, explain the necessary sequence, if any, of the various
steps, so as to distinguish the invention from other inventions.
125

Ibid. at 519.
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Modern convention would reformat the provisions as follows:
(3) The specification of an invention must correctly and fully describe the
invention and its operation or use as contemplated by the inventor; and, in
particular, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, it must:
(a) set out clearly the various steps in a process, etc…
(b) in the case of a machine, explain the principle, etc….; and
(c) in the case of a process, explain the necessary sequence, etc.

7. Conclusion
The duty to disclose an invention’s best mode of working as part of
the price of receiving a lengthy period of market exclusivity for an
invention has been part of Canadian patent law from the beginning. It is
a modest enough obligation:
Full disclosure creates few added transaction costs; eliminating it lessens the
value of the public’s return for the grant of exclusivity and imposes additional
costs on those who rely on the patent. Only what the inventor honestly
believes, at the claim date, to be her best method of practising the invention
need be disclosed and enabled.126

Whatever difficulties best mode compliance may have faced
elsewhere, the record in Canada, so far as revealed by reported
litigation, indicates a doctrine that has encouraged good practice and
been sensibly applied – apart from the recent deviation in the case law,
which, one hopes, will be soon overruled. Whether or not Parliament
retains a general best mode duty, subsection 27(3) could anyway do with
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redrafting to overcome Dickson J.’s objection of its failure to enunciate
its

governing

principles

“concisely”

and

therefore

“clearly”.127

Meanwhile, even if subsection 27(3) currently still reads like an 18th
century statute that is overly focused on machines, there is no duty nor
necessity for its interpretation to create more anomalies than were
present in its forbears in those less than best of times or modes.
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The Royal Commission’s Report on Patents, supra note 4 at 44, provided a helpful suggested redraft
over 50 years ago.
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